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Abstract 
A tendency towards abstract and overgeneral processing is a cognitive bias hypothesized to 
causally contribute to symptoms of depression. This hypothesis predicts that training dysphoric 
individuals to become more concrete and specific in their thinking would reduce depressive 
symptoms. To test this prediction, 60 participants with dysphoria were randomly allocated either 
to: (a) concreteness training; (b) bogus concreteness training, matched with concreteness training 
for treatment rationale, experimenter contact and treatment duration but without active 
engagement in concrete thinking; (c) a waiting-list, no training control. Concreteness training 
resulted in significantly greater decreases in depressive symptoms and significantly greater 
increases in concrete thinking than the waiting list and the bogus training control, and 
significantly greater decreases in rumination than the waiting-list control. These findings suggest 
that concreteness training has potential as a guided self-help intervention for mild-to-moderate 
depressive symptoms.  
 
Keywords: cognitive bias modification, rumination, overgeneralization, depression, abstract 
processing, guided self-help 
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 Cognitive models of psychopathology propose that biases in cognitive processing, such as 
in attention, memory, and interpretations, may underpin the onset and maintenance of emotional 
disorders. Consistent with such models, cognitive biases, such as selective attention to negative 
information and negative interpretation of ambiguity, have been repeatedly found in anxious and 
depressed patients, relative to controls (see reviews in Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 
2004; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Matthews, 1997). However, the association of these 
cognitive biases with anxiety and depression is not sufficient to demonstrate that the cognitive 
biases play a causal role in the development of negative affect: To demonstrate causality, 
experimental studies need to manipulate cognitive biases and find that such manipulations 
directly influence negative affect. To this end, the cognitive bias modification (CBM) approach 
has emerged in which participants repeatedly practise on cognitive-experimental tasks that 
engender a way of processing emotionally-relevant information that is either consistent or 
inconsistent with an identified cognitive bias (e.g., MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, 
& Holker, 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).  
However, to date, CBM research has narrowly focused on the attention and interpretation 
biases, which are considered most relevant to anxiety disorders (see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005) 
and on the effect of these biases in influencing anxiety vulnerability, rather than explicitly 
addressing cognitive biases in depression. One cognitive bias strongly implicated in the onset and 
maintenance of depression is the tendency to process self-relevant information in an 
overgeneralized and abstract manner (Beck, 1976; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). First, 
depression is characterized by an increased tendency towards overgeneralizations, in which a 
general rule or conclusion is drawn on the basis of isolated incidents and applied across the board 
to related and unrelated situations. For example, a single negative event, such as a failure, is 
interpreted as indicating a global, characterological inadequacy (Beck, 1976; Carver & Ganellen, 
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1983). Overgeneralization has been found to be specific to depression and not anxiety (Carver & 
Ganellen, 1983; Carver, Lavoie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988; Ganellen, 1988), and to prospectively 
predict subsequent levels of depression (Carver, 1998; Dykman, 1996; Edelman, Ahrens, & 
Haaga, 1994). Second, depression is characterized by increased recall of overgeneral memories, 
characterized by categoric summaries of repeated events (e.g., “making mistakes” or “playing 
golf every week”) even when asked to recall specific personal memories, relative to healthy 
controls and other psychiatric patients (except PTSD, Williams et al., 2007). Further, overgeneral 
memory retrieval predicts poorer long-term outcome for depression in prospective studies (see 
Williams et al., 2007 for a review).  
 Another cognitive process implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression (and 
other disorders, see Watkins, 2008) is depressive rumination, with longitudinal studies 
demonstrating that rumination prospectively predicts the likelihood, severity and duration of 
syndromal depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). Depressive 
rumination is characterized by an abstract, evaluative style of processing that involves recurrent 
thinking about the causes, meanings, and implications of depressive symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Experimental studies have indicated that such rumination plays a causal role in 
maintaining pathological overgeneral processing, whether overgeneral autobiographical memory 
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000), 
global negative self-judgments (Rimes & Watkins, 2005), or overgeneral attempts at problem-
solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Thus, depressive rumination is implicated in the 
development of overgeneralization. Moreover, there is evidence implicating abstract-overgeneral 
processing as an important dimension underpinning the negative effects of rumination (Watkins, 
2008).    
  Concreteness training reduces dysphoria  5 
 Therefore, there is convergent evidence that depression is characterized by bias towards 
overgeneralized processing, with this cognitive bias implicated in the onset and maintenance of 
depressive symptoms. Such processing parallels the conceptualization of abstract construals 
within the cognitive and social-cognitive literatures (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1987). In these theories, abstract construals are general, superordinate and 
decontextualized mental representations that convey the essential gist and meaning of events and 
actions, such as inferences of global traits that are invariant across different situations (e.g., 
“laziness”), or representations of “why” an action is performed and of its ends and consequences. 
In contrast, concrete construals are more low-level mental representations that include 
subordinate, contextual, and incidental details of events and actions, such as inferences of 
situation-specific states, such as “tiredness”, or representations of the specific “how” details of an 
action and of the means to an end. Thus, depression involves a cognitive bias characterized by the 
abstract construal of self-relevant (particularly negative) actions and events. Cognitive theories 
suggest that this abstract-overgeneral cognitive bias should causally influence negative affect, 
such that increasing abstract overgeneralization should increase negative affect (Beck, 1976; 
Carver & Ganellen, 1983).   
 Consistent with this hypothesis, overgeneralization mediates the effect of failure on 
subsequent negative affect (Brown & Dutton, 1995; Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989; 
Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Further, voluntarily recalling an emotional event in specific detail 
produces less emotional response than recalling it at a more general level (Philippot, Baeyens, & 
Douilliez, 2006; Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003), and practicing recall of specific 
autobiographical memories reduces the negative response to a later stressful task relative to recall 
of general autobiographical memories (Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006).  
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 Moreover, the CBM method has recently been used to investigate whether abstract 
processing causally influences emotional reactivity. In one study, after a failure experience, 
higher levels of trait rumination were associated with lower levels of positive affect, but only for 
participants who previously practiced abstract processing of emotional scenarios (“think about 
the causes, meanings and implications of each situation”) and not for participants who had 
practiced more concrete processing (“focus on the how the event happened”; Moberly & 
Watkins, 2006). In three replications, participants who practiced focusing on imagined emotional 
scenarios in a more concrete way demonstrated smaller increases in negative affect following a 
subsequent failure compared to participants who practiced more abstract processing when 
focusing on the same emotional scenarios (Watkins, Moulds, & Moberly, in press). 
 These studies provided initial evidence that the extent of abstract processing could be 
successfully modified (e.g., assessed via blind ratings of the concreteness of problem 
descriptions), and that this bias causally influences emotional reactivity. However, these studies 
only involved a mild failure induction and nonclinical participants, raising the questions of the 
generalizability of these findings to real-world settings, naturally-occurring negative affect, and 
more depressed samples. If as hypothesized, this cognitive bias does causally contribute to the 
maintenance of depression, sustained changes in this bias would be expected to influence 
depressive symptoms, e.g., an ongoing reduction in emotional reactivity may result in a reduction 
in depressive symptoms in response to potentially upsetting events in the real world. Recent work 
has suggested that repeated sessions of CBM training can be beneficial in reducing real-world 
anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007). A logical 
parallel is to examine whether repeated sessions of training more concrete processing 
(henceforward concreteness training) can reduce naturally occurring depressive symptoms in 
individuals with elevated levels of depressive symptoms, relative to a no-training control. Such a 
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finding would suggest that deliberately targeting the abstract-overgeneral bias can influence 
depressive symptoms, and provide preliminary evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
modifying this bias influences emotional vulnerability in real-life settings.  
  In order to extend the previous findings to a more vulnerable population, we used a 
sample of participants with dysphoria, operationalized as scoring at least 14 on the BDI-II (i.e., 
above the cut-off for mild depression; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). To examine repeated 
sessions of training, the experimental intervention involved daily practice for seven days.  
 The concreteness training consisted of explicit instructions to actively engage in 
generating concrete construals (e.g., focusing on the specific details of an event, on what makes 
each event unique, and on the process of how it happened) when imagining emotional events, 
audio-recorded for daily practice (henceforward CNT). These exercises were based on the 
experimental manipulation demonstrated to reduce negative affect in response to experimental 
stress (Watkins et al., in press). To make the training more applicable to daily life and more 
personally relevant, CNT included repeated practice on self-selected personal autobiographical 
memories.  
 Paralleling the previous studies of repeated CBM (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Mathews 
et al., 2007) we included a no-training control (waiting list control, WL). However, as noted by 
Mathews et al. (2007), the use of only a no-training control leaves open the possibility that any 
reductions in cognitive bias and symptoms may be due to non-specific factors, such as demand 
effects, positive expectations arising from the training rationale, or support and empathy from the 
researchers administering the training. Moreover, although a pilot study found that for 
participants with stable dysphoria, 7 days of repeated CNT added to relaxation training reduced 
depression significantly more than relaxation training alone, these conditions were not matched 
for treatment rationale or for duration of training (CNT plus relaxation > relaxation only) 
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(Watkins & Moberly, submitted). Thus, in the current study, to control for non-specific factors, 
we also included a control condition that was identically matched with the CNT condition for 
treatment rationale (reducing overgeneralization and rumination), duration of training (30 min 
daily practice), face-to-face researcher contact, and that involved daily exercises that were 
plausible as a means of increasing concreteness, but that did not involve participants actively 
engaging in concrete thinking (i.e., a bogus concreteness training condition, BGT).  The BGT 
condition consisted of repeated daily practice on a computerized interpretation training paradigm 
modified such that the final word fragments provided concrete disambiguations of emotional 
scenarios. Thus, whilst involving materials that had face validity for influencing concrete 
processing and sharing the same explanation as CNT concerning the value of becoming more 
concrete, BGT was not expected to directly alter the degree of concrete processing. We predicted 
that CNT would produce significantly greater decreases in abstract-overgeneral processing and 
depressive symptoms from pre-training to post-training than WL control and than BGT. To our 
knowledge, this paper involves the first reported attempt to examine whether repeated sessions of 
training to be more concrete and specific reduces depression in dysphoric individuals, relative to 
no training and bogus training, as a proof-of-principle test of the hypothesis that targeting the 
abstract-overgeneral bias influences depressive symptoms. 
Method 
Participants  
We recruited participants with dysphoria, operationalized in terms of individuals with 
scores > 14 on the BDI-II. Ninety-seven participants were assessed at a face-to-face pre-training 
assessment after responding to email, poster and newspaper advertisements asking for 
participants who experienced depressive symptoms. The majority (87%) were screened for 
dysphoria at initial contact prior to the face-to-face assessment. At the pre-training assessment, 
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we excluded participants who (a) reported a recent change in treatment for depression (change in 
antidepressant medication within last 8 weeks, n=7); starting CBT-based therapy in last 4 weeks, 
n=2), in order to reduce the likelihood of external treatments influencing our outcomes; (b) were 
no longer dysphoric (n=6); (c) met diagnostic criteria for bipolar disorder or psychosis (n=5), or 
presented as actively suicidal (n =1), who were referred back to their general practitioners for 
more appropriate care. Six participants did not proceed onto training (3 did not attend training 
session; for 3 technical problems with the first digital recordings precluded involvement). Ten 
participants did not attend the post-training (Time 2) assessment, despite repeated attempts to 
contact them (WL, n =1; CNT, n = 6; BGT, n = 3, 2 =3.8, p =.15). In total, 60 participants (21 
male, 39 female, 33 community adults, 27 students) met our eligibility criteria and completed the 
training intervention week and final assessment, of whom 31 (52%) met DSM-IV criteria for a 
current major depressive episode (MDE), 45 (75%) met criteria for a past MDE, and 8 (13.3%) 
were currently prescribed antidepressant medication.  
A series of Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) revealed that the ten non-attenders did not 
differ significantly from participants who completed the study in terms of age, BDI-II score, or 
RSQ score, all F’s < 1, but were significantly more depressed on the HRSD, F (1, 69) = 7.69, p < 
.01 (completers: M = 12.44, SD = 6.16; non-attenders, M = 18.10, SD = 4.60). Chi-squared tests 
found no difference between non-attenders and completers for gender, status (student vs. 
community), diagnosis of current or past MDE, all p’s > .17.  
Training Interventions  
Both training conditions involved an initial 1.5 - 2 hour session with an experimenter to 
explain and practise the training method, followed by 30 min practice daily for the next week. In 
both variants, participants were initially given an explicit rationale for the concreteness training 
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which explored how overgeneralization and rumination (e.g. “jumping to conclusions”, “losing 
perspective”) was unhelpful and how the training exercises were designed to reduce this 
unhelpful thinking and, thereby, reduce depression. 
Concreteness Training (CNT). In the initial training session, participants first worked 
through a 10 minute guided relaxation procedure in which they practised tensing and relaxing 
various parts of their body while focusing on their breathing and bodily sensations, designed to 
focus attention down to direct sensory experience, and to improve concentration for the later 
exercises. Next, for the remaining 60-80 minutes of the training session, participants practised the 
key elements of concrete processing via direct instructions, guiding questions, and the use of 
mental imagery: (a) focusing on sensory details in the moment (e.g., questions asking participants 
to focus on and describe what they could see, hear, feel); (b) noticing what is specific and 
distinctive about the context of the event; (c) noticing the process of how events and behaviors 
unfold (e.g., “imagine a movie of how events unfolded”); (d) generating detailed step-by-step 
plans of how to proceed from here. Guided by the experimenter, each participant practiced all 
these elements of concrete processing for 6 standardized scenarios (3 negative, e.g., not being 
invited to socialize after work by colleagues, 3 positive, e.g., making new friends at a party) and 
for three personally relevant, self-generated, specific autobiographic memories (defined as 
memories that took place at a particular place and time and lasted less than a day; one negative, 
one positive, and one memory of an occasion when the participant was highly immersed and 
absorbed in the process of an activity, because such “flow” experiences are characterized by 
concrete processing focused on the specific details of the task, Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).  
At the end of the training session, participants were given a digital recording of the 
exercises to practise at home (e.g., on compact disc), plus a diary to record their practice daily 
and a booklet explaining the training. The recording included two tracks, each lasting 
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approximately 30 minutes and replicating the sequence and contents of the training session (in 
order): 5 mins of relaxation, 25 mins focusing on 4 imaginary scenarios (2 positive, 2 negative, 
with different examples on each track) and recalling autobiographical memories (1 positive, 1 
negative, 1 absorbing), all using the same concreteness instructions. The recording prompted 
participants to think of different memories each time they practised the exercise. Participants 
were asked to practise these exercises by listening to the recording at a convenient time each day 
for a week, alternating between tracks each day.   
Thus, CNT included multiple elements all designed to encourage more concrete 
processing: sensory focus, mental imagery, recall of specific autobiographical memories, and 
explicit instructions to focus attention on experience, on distinctive details, on how events unfold 
and on how to proceed (focus on "how" is a key element in theoretical conceptualizations of 
concrete processing; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Importantly, unlike 
previous forms of CBM, this training was not designed to shift the valence of processing. Focus 
on negative material was balanced with focus on positive material to ensure that the training did 
not produce a positive cognitive bias or reduce a negative cognitive bias, but only increased 
concrete processing, unlike the use of mental imagery to enhance training of a positive 
interpretation bias (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 
2006).  
Bogus Training (BGT). Following the provision of an identical rationale to CNT, 
participants practiced the computerized task with the guidance of the experimenter in the 
laboratory. The task consisted of the following: (a) Participants read 64 computer-presented short 
descriptions of social situations that remain ambiguous in overall meaning, until the final word, 
presented as a fragment to be completed, which resolved the overall meaning for each scenario; 
(b) Across all the scenarios, each word fragment was chosen to direct the participant into 
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generating a concrete interpretation; (c) To progress to the next description, participants had to 
correctly type in the missing letter of the fragment and then respond to a comprehension question 
about the description, designed to further reinforce the required concrete interpretation. Of the 
descriptions, 32 were positive in valence and 32 were negative in valence, to ensure that the 
training did not alter the valence of any cognitive bias.  
 For example, one negative description read as follows: 
 You have been seeing each other for three weeks, and it seems that you have found a true 
soulmate. After dinner one evening, your partner explains that you can’t be together anymore. At 
that moment, you stare at the table and contemplate your empty gl_ss (i.e., “glass”, forcing a 
concrete construal of the situation, in contrast to an abstract construal, e.g. “life”). 
 Like CNT, BGT also involved mental imagery of the scenarios: before reading each 
computer-presented scenario, participants were instructed to imagine each scenario as vividly as 
possible. CNT and BGT used similar positive and negative scenarios involving both achievement 
and social themes. The same materials were used for each day of training. 
Participants were shown how to access the computerized training by logging onto a 
website, which allowed them to practise the training daily for a week. As in CNT, participants 
were provided with a booklet explaining the training and a weekly diary. The computerized 
training took approximately 30 minutes to complete each day. The web-based programme 
automatically recorded the number of times each individual logged onto the web-based training. 
Materials 
 The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 
1996). The SCID for mood disorders was administered at the pre-training assessment by trained 
research workers to assess current and past diagnoses of unipolar and bipolar depression. 
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 Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960; Williams J.B.W., 1998). 
The 17-item HRSD interview was administered at each assessment to provide an interviewer-
rated measure of the severity of depression (9 items rated 0-4, 8 items rated 0-2, 0 = symptom 
absent, range 0-54).  
Beck Depression Inventory–II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II assesses levels of 
depressive symptomatology with 21 items (range 0-63), each rated on a scale from 0 (no 
symptoms) to 3 (severe symptoms). We adapted the BDI-II so that participants were asked to 
indicate how they were feeling over the last week.  
Response Styles Questionnaire–Ruminative Responses Scale (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). The RSQ measures the extent to 
which individuals generally respond to feeling sad, down or depressed by ruminating on self, 
symptoms and on the causes and consequences of their mood, with 22-items (e.g.., “Why do I 
always react this way?”) each rated on a 4-point frequency scale, from 1 (almost never) to 4 
(almost always), with higher scores indicating more rumination (range 22-88).  
 Attitudes towards Self Scale (ATS; Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver et al., 1988; 
Ganellen, 1988). The ATS measures three potential cognitive vulnerabilities for depression: high 
standards (3 items, e.g., “Compared to other people, I expect a lot from myself”, range 3-15), 
self-criticism in response to failure (3 items, e.g., “When I don’t do as well as I hoped to, I often 
get upset with myself”, range 3-15) and overgeneralization (4 items, e.g., “A single failure can 
change me from feeling OK to seeing only the bad in myself”, range 4-20). Each item is scored 
on a 5-point scale from 1 (I agree a lot) to 5 (I disagree a lot), with all items bar one reversed 
scored, such that more agreement with items leads to higher vulnerability scores. We predicted 
that relative to the other conditions, CNT would reduce overgeneralization. Since a single session 
of concreteness training reduced emotional vulnerability to a subsequent failure event (Moberly 
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& Watkins, 2006), we predicted that CNT would reduce self-reported criticism in response to 
failure. We did not expect any effect of training on the endorsement of high standards. 
 Concreteness of Problem Descriptions. This task provided an observer-rated process 
measure of concreteness, based on the Problem Elaboration Questionnaire (PEQ; Stöber & 
Borkovec, 2002).  Participants were instructed to write down two major problems that they are 
currently repeatedly dwelling on and frequently thinking about and to then write down a brief 
description of the first major problem. This problem description was then scored by a rater blind 
to condition for level of concreteness according to Stöber and Borkovec’s (2002) 1-5 Likert-
scale, where 1 = abstract, 2 = somewhat abstract, 3 = neither-nor, 4 = somewhat concrete, 5 = 
concrete. On this scale, concrete thought is defined as “distinct, situationally specific, 
unequivocal, clear, singular” and abstract thought as “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, 
unclear, aggregated” (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002, p. 92). For example, a problem description such 
as “I think I am heading nowhere in life and career and relationships” would be rated as 1 
(abstract), whereas “I demanded the housekeeper do up my bootlace, my mother took exception 
and struck me” would be rated as 5 (concrete). This measure successfully discriminated levels of 
abstraction-concreteness between depressed patients and non-depressed controls (Watkins & 
Moulds, 2007) and was sensitive to experimental manipulations of ruminative thinking style 
(Watkins & Moulds, 2005). The rater demonstrated good inter-rater reliability with another blind 
rater (r = 0.82,  = 0.70).  
 To explore whether the interventions influenced problem solving, participants were asked 
to write down how they would attempt to solve the first major problem, and these solutions were 
then rated against the Means Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) criteria (e.g., Marx, Williams, & 
Claridge, 1992; Platt & Spivack, 1972; Platt & Spivack, 1975). A judge unaware of condition 
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scored the written strategies for (a) number of relevant means, where each mean is defined as a 
discrete step which is effective in moving the person towards successful resolution of the 
problem or in overcoming a potential obstacle; (b) their effectiveness, using a 7-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all effective) to 7 (extremely effective) (Marx et al., 1992). There 
was good inter-rater reliability with a second rater, also unaware of condition (agreement across 
all responses, r = .82 for means, r =.74 for effectiveness).  
 Credibility and Expectations Questionnaire (CEQ; Devilly & Borkovec, 2000). 
Participants in the CNT and BGT conditions completed the CEQ (referring to depression 
symptoms) at the end of the initial training session. Three items assessed the credibility of the 
treatment rationale (e.g., “At this point, how logical does the training offered to you seem?”), 
items scored from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very). Three items rated expectancy that the training would 
be helpful (e.g., “At this point, how much do you really feel that the training will help you to 
reduce your depression symptoms?”), items scored from 0% to 100%.  
 
Procedure 
Individuals who expressed an interest in a study of self-help treatment for depression 
were contacted (by email, letter, or telephone) and asked to complete and return the BDI-II. An 
appointment was then made as soon as possible with participants scoring in the dysphoric range. 
At this assessment meeting, the participant provided informed consent and completed the HRSD, 
BDI-II, RSQ, ATS, PEQ and the SCID for mood disorders (Time 1: pre-training assessment). If 
participants met study criteria, they were then randomized into WL, CNT or BGT conditions. For 
participants randomized to the training conditions, a training session was arranged as soon as 
possible, after which participants were encouraged to practise the exercises daily for the 
following week. As soon as possible after the training week, a post-intervention assessment 
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(Time 2) involving the HRSD, BDI-II, RSQ, ATS, and PEQ was completed. Participants in the 
WL condition were given no intervention following the assessment and completed their Time 2 
assessment between 10-14 days after the assessment session, matching the interval between Time 
1 and Time 2 assessments in the training conditions. Participants in the WL condition were 
offered the option of receiving CNT following this assessment if they so wished. For each 
participant, the initial assessment and training were provided by one researcher, whereas the post-
training assessment was administered by a second researcher, blind to condition. The study 
procedure was approved by the University ethics committee. 
Results 
Background characteristics 
We conducted a multivariate ANOVA with Condition (WL vs. CNT vs. BGT) as the 
between group factor to examine whether demographic and baseline pre-training variables 
differed between conditions (see Table 1)
1
. This revealed no significant difference between 
conditions, F (7, 50) = 1.42, p = .16. Chi-squared tests of contingency revealed no difference 
between Conditions for gender, status (student vs. community participant), diagnosis of current 
or past MDE, all p’s > .24. 
Effect of training on depressive symptoms 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the BDI-II and HRSD before and after training 
(Time 1 and 2). To test our prediction that CNT would reduce depressive symptoms significantly 
more than WL, we conducted separate mixed design 3 X 2 repeated measures ANOVAs, with 
Condition (WL vs. CNT vs. BGT) as the between groups factor, Time (pre-training vs. post-
training) as the repeated measures factor and depression as the dependent variable (separately for 
BDI-II, HRSD respectively). As predicted, for the BDI-II, there was a significant main effect of 
Time, F(1, 55) = 49.51, p < .001, p
2  
= .47, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition  
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Time, F(2, 55) = 8.27, p < .001, p
2  
= .24. This interaction reflected a significant reduction in 
BDI-II from pretraining to posttraining in the CNT condition, t(18) = 7.71, p < .001 (95% CI 
9.61, 16.81) and the BGT condition, t(18) = 3.55, p < .005 (95% CI 2.96, 11.56), but no 
significant reduction in the WL condition, t(19) = 1.31, p = .205 (95% CI -1.45, 6.35). Post-hoc 
Scheffe tests on the reduction in BDI-II from pretraining to posttraining revealed that there was a 
significantly greater reduction in the CNT condition relative to the WL condition, p = .001 (95% 
CI 4.10, 17.43), but not relative to the BGT condition, p = .095 (95% CI -.80, 12.70), and no 
difference between the BGT and WL conditions, p = .20 (95% CI -1.85, 11.48). 
 For the HRSD, there was a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 57) = 16.42, p < .001, p
2  
= .22, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 57) = 5.90, p < .005, p
2  
= 
.17. This interaction reflected a significant reduction in HRSD from pretraining to posttraining in 
the CNT condition, t(19) = 5.36, p < .001 (95% CI 4.05, 9.25), but no significant reduction in the 
BGT condition, t(19) = 1.43, p = .17 (95% CI -.83, 4.43), or WL condition, t(19) = .49, p = .62 
(95% CI -2.24, 3.64). Post-hoc Scheffe tests on the reduction in HRSD from pretraining to 
posttraining revealed that there was a significantly greater reduction in the CNT condition 
relative to the WL condition, p = .008 (95% CI 1.31, 10.58), and relative to the BGT condition, p 
= .038 (95% CI .21, 9.48), and no difference between the BGT and WL conditions, p = .84 (95% 
CI -3.53, 5.73).  
 We also calculated Cohen’s d for the change in depressive symptoms between the CNT 
and WL conditions. This analysis indicated a large effect size (BDI-II, d = 1.36; HRSD, d = 
1.00). 
 A set of further analyses examined whether current diagnosis (current MDE vs. no current 
MDE), history of depression (past MDE vs. no MDE), and antidepressant medication use (current 
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use vs. no use) influenced the beneficial effects of CNT by adding each variable as a between 
groups factor to separate repeated measures ANOVAs. All these analyses replicated the previous 
findings of a significant interaction of Condition by Time on depressive symptoms (e.g., for 
current diagnosis, BDI-II, F(2, 52) = 6.66, p < .005; HRSD, F(2, 54) = 4.84, p < .05) and 
critically found no significant interaction of present or past diagnosis or antidepressant use with 
the effects of the different training conditions on symptoms over time (all F’s < 1.25, p’s > .27)2.  
 We also conducted an “intention-to-treat” analysis in which the non-attenders at the post-
training assessment were included in the analysis by replicating their pre-training scores as their 
post-training scores, i.e., on the conservative assumption that their depressive symptoms did not 
change at all. Replicating the previous findings, for the BDI-II, there was a significant main 
effect of Time, F(1, 65) = 36.15, p < .001, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition  
Time, F(2, 65) = 4.70, p < .05, reflecting a significant reduction in depression symptoms from 
pretraining to posttraining in the CNT condition, t(24) = 5.79, p < .001 (95% CI 6.46, 13.61) and 
the BGT condition, t(20) = 3.40, p = .003 (95% CI 2.44, 10.10), but no significant reduction in 
the WL condition, t(20) = 1.31, p = .204 (95% CI -1.38, 6.04). Likewise, for the HRSD, there 
was a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 67) = 12.98, p < .001,  qualified by a significant 
interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 67) = 4.17, p < .05, reflecting a significant reduction in 
depression symptoms from pretraining to posttraining in the CNT condition, t(25) = 4.64, p < 
.001 (95% CI 2.85, 7.38), but no significant reduction in the BGT condition, t(22) = 1.43, p = .17 
(95% CI -.71, 3.84), or WL condition, t(20) = .50, p = .62 (95% CI -2.13, 3.46). 
Effect of training on measures of the abstract- overgeneral cognitive bias 
 In order to test whether training successfully modified the abstract-overgeneral cognitive 
bias, we conducted a further series of mixed design 3 (Condition: WL vs. CNT vs. BGT) X 2 
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(Time: pre-training vs. post-training) repeated measures ANOVAs, with each cognitive measure 
as the dependent variable. We predicted that relative to the other conditions, CNT would increase 
the concreteness of problem descriptions but reduce rumination, overgeneralization and self-
criticism. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for these measures before and after training.   
 As predicted, for the concreteness of problem descriptions, there was a significant main 
effect of Time, F(1, 56) = 9.89, p < .003, p
2  
= .15, qualified by a significant interaction of 
Condition  Time, F(2, 56) = 5.10, p < .01, p
2  
= .15. This interaction reflected a significant 
increase in the concreteness of the problem description from pretraining to posttraining in the 
CNT condition, t(18) = 4.85, p < .001 (95% CI .63, 1.58) but no significant increase in either the 
BGT condition, t(19) = .57, p = .58 (95% CI -.70, .40), or the WL condition, t(19) = .40, p = .69 
(95% CI -.62, .42). Post-hoc Scheffe tests on the change in concreteness from pretraining to 
posttraining revealed that there was a significantly greater increase in concreteness in the CNT 
condition relative to the WL condition, p = .023 (95% CI .12, 1.89) and relative to the BGT 
condition, p = .032 (95% CI .07, 1.84), but no difference between the WL and BGT conditions, p 
= .99 (95% CI -.93, .83).  
 For self-report of rumination, there was a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 55) = 
24.51, p < .001, p
2  
= .31, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 55) = 
4.34, p < .05, p
2  
= .14. This interaction reflected a significant reduction in rumination from 
pretraining to posttraining in the CNT condition, t(18) = 4.94, p < .001 (95% CI 5.02, 12.46) and 
in the BGT condition, t(18) = 2.85, p = .011 (95% CI 1.59, 10.51), but not in the WL condition, 
t(19) = .69, p = .50 (95% CI -2.34, 4.64). Post-hoc Scheffe tests on the change in rumination from 
pretraining to posttraining reveal that there was a significantly greater reduction in rumination in 
the CNT condition relative to the WL condition, p = .02 (95% CI 1.00, 14.17) but not relative to 
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the BGT condition, p = .60 (95% CI -3.98, 9.35), with no difference between the BGT and WL 
conditions, p = .18 (95% CI -1.68, 11.49)
3
.   
For ATS-overgeneralization, there was a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 55) = 7.91, 
p < .01, p
2  
= .13,  but no significant interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 55) = 2.20, p = .12, 
p
2  
= .07. Nonetheless, as predicted, post-hoc t-tests revealed a significant reduction in ATS-
overgeneralization from pretraining to posttraining in the CNT condition, t(18) = 2.76, p = .013 
(95% CI .49, 3.61) but not in the BGT condition, t(18) = 1.29, p = .21 (95% CI -.52, 2.21) or the 
WL condition, t(19) = .40, p = .69 (95% CI -.85, 1.25). 
For ATS-self-criticism, there was not a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 55) = 2.82,  
p = .099, p
2  
= .049, but there was a significant interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 55) = 8.38, 
p < .001, p
2  
= .23. This interaction reflected a significant reduction in self-criticism from 
pretraining to posttraining in the CNT condition, t(18) = 4.44, p < .001 (95% CI .72, 2.01), no 
significant change in the BGT condition, t(18) = .37, p = .72 (95% CI -.74, 1.06), but a significant 
increase in self-criticism in the WL condition, t(19) = - 2.15, p< .05 (95% CI -1.08, -0.14). For 
ATS-high standards, there was no main effect of Time, F(1, 55) = .20, p = .65, p
2  
= .004, and no 
significant interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 55) = .49, p = .61, p
2  
= .018
4,5
. 
Extent of Practice, Credibility, Expectancy  
 We calculated a series of ANOVAs with Condition (CNT vs. BGT) as the independent 
variable, and with credibility, expectations, and number of days of practice as separate dependent 
variables, to explore whether CNT and BGT were seen as equally likely to be helpful and utilised 
to the same degree by participants. There was no difference between the number of days of 
practice (reported in daily diary for CNT; automatically recorded when participant logged on 
website for BGT), F (1, 38) = 2.45, p = .13, p
2  
= .06 (CNT: M= 6.25, SD = 1.45; BGT: M = 
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5.20, SD = 2.63). There was a trend towards CNT being rated as more credible, F (1, 38) = 3.78, 
p = .059, p
2  
= .09 (CNT: M = 6.87, SD = 1.15; BGT: M = 5.93, SD = 1.81), and having more 
positive expectations than BGT, F (1, 38) = 3.91, p = .055, p
2  
= .09 (CNT: M = 63.56, SD = 
21.30; BGT: M = 49.11, SD = 24.79). This is not surprising given the greater face validity of 
CNT since it involves practice on personally relevant scenarios in daily life compared to practice 
on a circumscribed computer task.  
 Nonetheless, to examine whether the differential effects of the training conditions might 
be due to different rationale credibility and expectancy in the training, we compared participants 
in each condition after matching for levels of credibility and expectancy. Examination of the data 
revealed two outliers within the BGT condition who endorsed much lower credibility to the 
training than other participants (credibility < 2.5). When we excluded these outliers, the training 
conditions were not statistically different for credibility, F (1, 36) = 1.65, p = .21, p
2  
= .04 
(CNT: M = 6.87, SD = 1.15; BGT: M = 6.33, SD = 1.41) or expectancy, F (1, 36) = 2.17, p = .15, 
p
2  
= .06 (CNT: M = 63.56, SD = 21.30; BGT: M = 52.98, SD = 22.95). Critically, when our 
principal analyses were repeated for this matched sample, our findings were identical: repeated 
measures ANOVAs replicated the previous findings of significant Condition  Time interactions 
for BDI-II, F(2, 54) = 8.15, p < .001, p
2  
= .23; for HRSD, F(2, 55) = 5.94, p < .001, p
2  
= .18; 
for rumination, F(2, 54) = 4.25, p < .05, p
2  
= .16; for concreteness of problem descriptions, F(2, 
54) = 5.13, p < .01, p
2  
= .16; and for ATS self-criticism, F(2, 54) = 8.21, p < .001, p
2  
= .23. 
These results suggest that the differential effects of the conditions were not due to credibility or 
expectancy.  
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Discussion 
The current study aimed to test whether the beneficial effects of a single session of 
concreteness training in reducing emotional reactivity (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins et al., 
in press) could be extended to real-world improvements in depressive symptoms if repeated over 
multiple occasions in dysphoric participants. The rationale for the study was that abstract and 
overgeneral processing was hypothesized to be a cognitive bias involved in maintaining 
depression: therefore targeting this bias was predicted to reduce depressive symptoms. Moreover, 
recent work has suggested the benefit of repeated sessions of CBM in reducing anxiety (Mathews 
& MacLeod, 2002; Mathews et al., 2007). The current study examined whether repeated sessions 
of CBM could similarly reduce symptoms of depression, as an initial proof-of-principle that 
concreteness training can be beneficial. To this end, participants with dysphoria were randomly 
allocated to waiting list (WL), concreteness training (CNT) or bogus training (BGT) conditions.  
As predicted, CNT reduced depressive symptoms significantly more than WL control on 
both self-reported (BDI-II) and interviewer-rated (HRSD) measures of depressive symptoms. 
Importantly, there was no significant change in depressive symptoms in the WL control, reducing 
the likelihood that any improvement in symptoms across the training phase was due to 
spontaneous remission or regression to the mean. Also as predicted, relative to WL, CNT 
significantly increased concreteness of problem descriptions and significantly reduced rumination 
and self-criticism. These findings provide initial evidence that repeated concreteness training can 
have beneficial effects on naturally occurring symptoms in a sub-clinical sample. 
BGT was included to provide a control for non-specific treatment factors shared with 
CNT and, thereby, to determine if CNT had active ingredients above and beyond non-specific 
treatment factors such as therapeutic rationale, credibility, positive expectancy, face-to-face 
contact and duration of practice. CNT reduced depressive symptoms significantly more than BGT 
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on the interviewer-rated HRSD, but only showed a trend towards a significantly greater reduction 
in symptoms on the self-reported BDI-II. Both CNT and BGT significantly reduced depressive 
symptoms on the BDI-II but only CNT significantly reduced depressive symptoms on the HRSD. 
Similarly, CNT increased the observer ratings of the concreteness of problem descriptions 
significantly more than BGT, but did not produce significantly greater change than BGT on self-
reported rumination and ATS-overgeneralization (although CNT reduced self-reported ATS-self-
criticism significantly more than BGT). Nonetheless for the change in depressive symptoms from 
pretraining to posttraining, CNT significantly differed from WL control, whereas BGT did not, 
indicating that CNT had a stronger treatment effect than BGT. Thus, the results partially 
confirmed our hypothesis that CNT would reduce depression more than BGT. This study 
therefore provides initial evidence that CBM focused on targeting the abstract-overgeneral bias 
was successful at reducing depression relative to both control conditions.  
Moreover, although CNT and BGT were deliberately matched for non-specific treatment 
factors, CNT involved repeated exercises to enhance concreteness by the active generation of 
concrete memories, images and descriptions, which were not present in BGT. Consistent with 
CNT actively engaging participants in exercises to shift concreteness, CNT increased the 
observer ratings of the concreteness of problem descriptions significantly more than BGT. 
Moreover, the significantly greater treatment effect of CNT compared to BGT on the observer-
rated HRSD, suggests that CNT had active therapeutic mechanisms in addition to any non-
specific factors shared with BGT. It is therefore a plausible hypothesis that increased 
concreteness is this additional active therapeutic mechanism. Moreover, given the shared non-
specific elements between BGT and CNT, we speculate that the beneficial effects of BGT are due 
to non-specific treatment effects such as positive expectancy and support from the researchers 
administering the training. Consistent with this possibility, BGT resulted in significant 
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improvements on self-report measures only (BDI, RSQ), which are more likely to be influenced 
by an expectation of improvement, by a convincing therapeutic rationale and by associated 
demand effects, than observer measures (HRSD, concreteness of descriptions) which are less 
susceptible to such effects.   
Nonetheless, before we can definitively confirm that CNT worked by reducing the 
abstract-overgeneral bias, we need to establish that training did in fact reduce the abstract-
overgeneral bias, and that this change mediated the treatment effect
6
. Although the observed 
changes from pretraining to posttraining are suggestive of this mechanism, they are not 
conclusive. Consistent with the hypothesis that CNT reduced the abstract-overgeneral bias, CNT 
significantly increased the concreteness of problem descriptions relative to both WL and BGT. 
This increase in concreteness pre-to-post training showed a trend towards being significantly 
correlated with reduction in depression pre-to-post training, indicating that it may be a potential 
mediator
5
. Similarly, there was a significant reduction in ATS-overgeneralization from 
pretraining to posttraining in the CNT condition only, although there was no overall Condition by 
Time interaction for overgeneralization.  
However, the results also suggest that change in self-criticism may be a potential 
mechanism underlying clinical improvement: CNT reduced self-criticism significantly more than 
WL and BGT, and reduction in self-criticism was correlated with reduction in depression
5
. 
Although consistent with previous studies showing that concreteness training reduced emotional 
reactivity (Moberly & Watkins, 2006), it is not clear to what extent change in self-criticism 
reflects change in the abstract-overgeneral bias. Moreover, the current study only assessed 
measures of cognitive bias before and after training, whereas a more definitive test of the 
hypothesized mechanism would examine measures on a day-to-day basis as the training 
progressed, for example, by seeing whether participants actually interpreted the intervention 
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scenarios more concretely each day. Likewise, replication of these findings on other measures 
such as the number of overgeneral memories retrieved on the autobiographical memory test is 
necessary to provide conclusive evidence for the hypothesis that CNT works by reducing the 
abstract-overgeneral bias.  
Finally, we included multiple elements in CNT, each targeting concrete processing in 
complementary ways, in order to increase our likelihood of shifting the cognitive bias. However, 
one limitation of this multi-dimensional nature of the training is that we do not know for sure 
which element(s) was critical to its beneficial effects. For example, either relaxation or improved 
problem-solving (resulting from imagining detailed step-by-step plans) are elements that could 
potentially account for symptom reduction. However, arguing against relaxation as a key active 
component, this component was brief (only 5 mins on the audio-recording) and a pilot study 
found that CNT plus relaxation reduced depression significantly more than relaxation alone 
(Watkins & Moberly, submitted). Similarly, the failure to find any effect of condition on the 
solutions generated to personal problems is inconsistent with problem-solving being an active 
element of CNT
4
. Nonetheless, further research could usefully disentangle which elements are 
critical to symptom reduction, via a dismantling study comparing separate components of CNT.  
CNT passes the first tests necessary to establish that an experimental paradigm may be 
translatable into a useful clinical intervention, since it influenced naturally-occurring depressive 
symptoms in an at-risk population (mild-to-moderate levels of depression) and had greater 
efficacy than waiting list control or bogus training. Furthermore, pre-training symptoms were 
characteristic of those found in depressed patients in primary care, with 50% experiencing a 
current major depressive episode, and 75% having previously had major depression. Moreover, 
analyses indicated that the effects of CNT on symptom reduction was not a function of current 
major depression, past history of depression or antidepressant use, and were still found on a 
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conservative intention-to-treat analysis, suggesting the clinical relevance of these findings. The 
effect size for CNT versus WL was of an order of magnitude comparable to that found in a meta-
analysis of randomized controlled trials of self-help treatments for depression versus waiting list 
controls (d = 0.82, Gellatly et al., 2007) and a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials of 
CBT for depression versus waiting list/placebo controls (d = 0.82, Glouagen, Cottraux, Cucherat 
& Blackburn, 1998). These findings suggest that CNT has potential as a treatment.  
However, we note several reasons to be cautious about CNT as a treatment. First, we only 
examined the effects of the training over one week so there is no data on whether the benefits of 
training are maintained in the medium or long-term. Second, we did not assess whether the 
intervention changed diagnostic status. Third, the sample consisted of a dysphoric sample rather 
than exclusively patients with a diagnosis of major depression. Fourth, it is important to examine 
the rates of drop-out from the treatment in clinical samples to determine acceptability to patients. 
In order to determine the potential for concreteness training as a treatment intervention, future 
research will need to further examine (a) the durability and stability of its antidepressant effect 
over weeks and months, and (b) its generalizability to patients with diagnoses of major 
depression. Nonetheless, this study was designed as an experimental test of “proof-of-principle” 
to see whether repeated CNT could influence depression, rather than as a fully-workable 
treatment. We speculate that treatment benefits may be enhanced by including more support and 
encouragement, perhaps via follow-on telephone contact, plus a longer treatment period. If these 
benefits are replicated, CNT could be delivered as a guided self-help intervention within a 
stepped care approach, with the patient undertaking the training exercises with minimal guidance 
from a health professional. This treatment format has the advantages of being accessible, easy to 
disseminate, relatively inexpensive, and deliverable to high volumes of patients, and, as such, 
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may provide an innovative means to reach the many patients with depression who do not have 
access to psychological help (Hollon et al., 2002). 
 Despite the several limitations noted above, the study has a number of strengths including 
the use of a sub-clinical group with moderate levels of depressive symptoms, the use of both no-
training waiting list and bogus training control conditions, blind assessment of outcome, and the 
use of both self-report and interviewer-rated measures of depression and of cognitive bias. 
Moreover, there was a matched rationale and duration of treatment between the training condition 
and the bogus training condition and measures of the credibility and expectancy of the training. 
Further, to our knowledge, these findings are the first demonstration that repeated sessions of 
CBM designed to target the abstract-overgeneral bias characteristic of depression can reduce 
symptoms of depression. In conclusion, we have demonstrated that it is possible to reduce 
depressive symptoms in dysphoric individuals by repeated practice in adopting a more concrete 
way of processing self-related information, relative to no training control and bogus training 
conditions. Future research will need to more definitively establish the mechanism of change 
underpinning this treatment effect.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 
Of the 60 participants, we were missing data for one set of pre-training questionnaires 
(BDI-II, RSQ, ATS, PEQ) and for one set of post-training questionnaires (i.e., non return of 
questionnaires), such that n = 58 for analysis of questionnaires, but n =60 for analysis of HRSD. 
 
2
To further test the clinical significance of these findings, we repeated analyses for only 
those participants with at least moderate levels of depression (BDI-II > 19). For the BDI-II, the 
previous findings were replicated: a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 38) = 63.71, p < .001, 
p
2  
= .63, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 38) = 3.57, p < .05, p
2  
= .16. For the HRSD, there was a main effect of Time, F(1, 40) = 24.78, p < .001, p
2  
= .63, and 
although there was not a significant interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 40) = 2.15, p = .13, p
2  
= .10, the pattern of findings and effect size was similar to that observed for the full sample. 
 3
 The same pattern of results was found for the depression-related rumination and 
brooding subtypes of rumination as for the total rumination score. There was a significant 
Condition  Time interaction for both depression-related rumination and brooding, reflecting 
decreases in both subtypes of rumination in CNT and BGT but not in the WL condition. 
However, there was not a significant Condition  Time interaction for reflection, F(2, 55) = 1.21, 
p = .30. 
 
4 
There was no main effect of Time or interaction of Condition  Time for either number 
of means or ratings of effectiveness of solutions ((all F’s < 1, p > .63, except effect of Time for 
effectiveness rating, F(1, 56) = 2.45, p = .12)), indicating no differential effect of the conditions 
on problem-solving.  
 
5 
Increase in concreteness of problem descriptions from pretraining to posttraining showed 
a trend towards being significantly correlated with reduction in depression from pretraining to 
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posttraining (n = 59; BDI-II, r = -.25, p = .058; HRSD, r = -.23, p = .08). Decrease in self-
criticism was correlated with reduction in depression (n = 58; BDI-II, r = 40, p = .002; HRSD, r 
= 31, p = .016. Decrease in rumination was correlated with reduction in depression (n = 58; BDI-
II, r = 43, p = .001; HRSD, r = .47, p = .001).
 
 
6
This study is underpowered in terms of conducting a meaningful mediational analysis, 
and, therefore, this was not calculated. 
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Table 1.  
Sample Characteristics and Means (SD in parentheses) at the initial pre-training Assessment by 
Condition  
 
Variable 
 Condition  
WL  (N = 20) CNT (N = 20)* BGT (N = 20) 
Gender 13 females 15 females 11 females 
Status 6 students 10 students 11 students 
Current MDE 8 13 10 
Past MDE 13 17 15 
Age 39.05 (16.86) 34.65 (14.28) 31.15 (12.52) 
BDI-II 26.45 (12.64) 25.50 (6.69) 25.85 (10.03) 
HRSD 12.10 (7.23) 13.65 (5.19) 11.95 (5.97) 
RSQ 53.75 (7.61) 53.47 (11.69) 58.29 (10.10) 
ATS overgeneralization 17.40 (2.33) 16.00 (3.40) 15.90 (3.32) 
ATS high standards 11.95 (2.95) 12.95 (2.20) 12.15 (2.37) 
ATS self-criticism 12.80 (1.58) 13.58 (1.95) 12.85 (2.45) 
Note. WL = waiting list no-training control; CNT = concreteness training; BGT = bogus 
concreteness training; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory–II; HRSD = Hamilton Rating Scale 
for Depression; RSQ = Response Style Questionnaire–Rumination subscale; ATS = Attitude to 
Self Scale; MDE = major depressive episode. *pre-training questionnaires are missing for 1 CNT 
participant. 
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Table 2.  
Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) for Depressive Symptomatology and Measures 
of Cognitive Bias before and after Training 
Measure 
 
 Condition  
WL  (N = 20) CNT (N = 20)* BGT (N = 20)* 
HRSD    
      Pre-training 12.10 (7.23) 13.65 (5.19) 11.95 (5.97) 
      Post-training 11.40 (4.81) 7.00 (4.41) 10.15 (6.11) 
BDI-II    
     Pre-training 26.45 (12.64) 24.89 (6.29) 25.85 (10.03) 
     Post-training 24.00 (11.28) 11.68 (6.29) 18.53 (10.89) 
RSQ-total    
     Pre-training 53.75 (7.61) 53.47 (11.69) 58.29 (10.10) 
     Post-training 52.60 (9.46) 44.76 (9.57) 52.00 (10.03) 
PEQ-concreteness    
     Pre-training 2.35 (1.39) 2.11 (0.99) 2.50 (1.00) 
     Post-training 2.45 (1.43) 3.21 (0.98) 2.65 (1.18) 
Solution means    
     Pre-training 1.35 (0.87) 1.89 (1.05) 1.50 (0.83) 
     Post-training 1.35 (1.04) 1.68 (0.95) 1.65 (0.93) 
Solution effectiveness    
    Pre-training 2.15 (0.93) 2.79 (1.13) 2.50 (0.95) 
    Post-training 2.50 (0.95) 2.89 (0.87) 2.65 (0.74) 
ATS-overgeneralization    
     Pre-training 17.40 (2.33) 16.00 (3.40) 15.90 (3.32) 
     Post-training 17.20 (2.38) 13.95 (4.13) 14.95 (3.98) 
ATS-high standards    
     Pre-training 11.95 (2.95) 12.95 (2.20) 12.15 (2.37) 
     Post-training 11.75 (3.31) 12.63 (2.17) 12.21 (2.44) 
ATS-self-criticism    
     Pre-training 12.80 (1.58) 13.58 (1.95) 12.85 (2.45) 
     Post-training 13.35 (1.35) 12.21 (1.78) 12.68 (1.73) 
Note. WL = waiting list no training control; CNT = concreteness training; BGT = bogus 
concreteness training; HRSD = Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression; BDI-II = Beck Depression 
Inventory–II; RSQ = Response Style Questionnaire–Rumination subscale; PEQ-concreteness = 
Problem Elaboration Questionnaire non-self-report measure of concreteness of problem 
descriptions; ATS = Attitude to Self Scale. *Questionnaire scores missing for 1 participant each 
in CNT (N = 19) and BGT (N= 19). 
